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At all stages in the social planning operation values playa
decisive role. Dahn's six value dilemmas confronting the
planner are explored, with two added: planner values are often
indistinguishable from the escape from controversy and are unwilling
to reveal monopol istic and repressive atmospheres and situations
in society. If Mnrcuse and the Frankfurt School are correct in
characterizing society as repressive, then the obligation of the
planner accelerates even more to the forefront - to represent the
most liberating of values. Rein's three planning strategies are
traced: rational analysis {knowledge power}, citizen participation,
and elite consensus, with the accompanying value difficulties of
each.
The purpose of this study is a consideration of value problems in the quest for sanction in
social planning. Values are heavily laden throughout the entire process of social planning,
perhaps more so than in any other field of social work endeavor {if only because more people are
involved}. The entire question of value in social planning is essentially a philosophical one, in
that the term itself necessarily involves and connotes ultimate philosophic considerations such as
beauty, truth and the good {Frankena, 1967:229}. As soon as the planner begins his work he is
already functioning with three rncjor value espousers: 1} the elite institutions, 2} the consumer
clients, and 3) himself. The last may be the most difficult of al" in that one's own values
slither into play in the most inauspicious of ways, and often under the "cloak of neutrality"
(Friedrichs, 1970:77-91).
KJS IX, 1
What, then, do we rnecn by "value." Le Senne thought of value as eternal by reason
of its origin but becoming temporal by reason of human conditions and initiative. Val ue was an
IIi nexhaustible expansion II (Dauenhauer, 1971:38-39). Wi II iams (1965:401 -403) notes that
values are concerned with the ends or goals of action, and are consanguineous with the choice
of means, conjointly affecting the sundry categories in which reality structuring takes place in
the cognitive processes of the viewer. Values are: 1) touchstones or criteria for decisions on
what should be wanted, and 2) conceptions of the desirable. They are general and directive
principles of a noticeably high, abstract nature that serve as theoretical lighthouses for tangible
patterns of behavior. Value, then, is any directive which proceeds from a higher norm(s) to the
lower norms of an order (Kfuckhohn, et.al., 1951~388-433). A preference within this frame-
work would be a "value in cc tion" (Kahn, 1969:98). Corzo and Yanouzas (1967:147) seem. to
sum it up best when they reiterate that values "ore the criteria or standards that guide
individuals in their selections of the a ppropriate behavioral alternatives in a given siruction ."
What is meant precisely by the word "sanction"? By sanction we imply authorization or
ratification. It most emphatically implies an authority that involves a relationship which obtains
between: 1) the activities that are prescribed or permitted by the norm of which that sanction is
a part, and 2) the stable, persistent expectations which individuals have in regard to want-
gratification and want-deprivation (gratification and deprivation being viewed as opposite
directions on a single psychological continuum) (Parsons, 1951 :203). How much individuals or
groups wi II deprive themselves and for how long is dependent on the amount of sanction or
credence they wi If allow the planner. Sanction implies legitimacy, especially for those
categories of city planning and social reform "thor share a common ideological commitment to
introduce social innovation - new programs and new ideas that will reduce or eliminate social
problems" (Rein, 1969:233).
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Lastly, what do we mean by the word "plcnning "? Perhaps a generic concept of planning
could best be epitomized as lion ongoing process concerned with detailing the differences between
a set of needs and the resources available to meet these needs" (Kaitz and Hymen, 1970:159).
This definition could apply equally well to both social and physical planning, as could many
other concepts discussed in this essay. But our focus wi II be on social planning, which
Robert Morris describes as "o relatively systematic method which men use to solve social problems"
(Morris and Binstock, 1966:5). Essential to this planning process is, obviously, the planner. It
is to him that sanction is garnered, assumed, or granted. It is his responsibility to determine the
dimensions and the possibilities of this sanction, and necessarily, its component, inevitable
limitations.
The Importance of Values in Social Planning
At any and all stages in the planning operation values playa decisive, crucial, all-
important role (Kahn, 1969:99). For if it is true that policy comes before planning, then we
can assuredly state that "o value is logically prior to the policy which carries it into effect"
(Simey, 1968:66). Perhaps the social theorist and profound observer of the American social
scene, Gunnar Mfrdal, made the most erudite observations concerning values:
That a term is value-loaded is, even when used in scientific inquiry, not of
itself a ground for objection. It has been a misguided endeavour in social science
for a little more than a century to seek to make 'objective' our main value-
loaded concepts by giving them a ·pur~ly sclentific ' definition, supposedly free
from any association with political valuations. . . . The re is no way of
studying social reality other than from the viewpoint of ,human ideals. A
'disinterested social science' has never existed and, for logical reasons, cannot
exist. The value connotation of our main concepts represents our interest in
a matter, gives direction to our thoughts and significance to our inferences.
It poses the questions without which there are no answers (Mrydal, 1958:1).
Since consciousness is manifested "indubi tob ly" in man in a most singular and unique
way (Teilhard de Chardin, 1961:83), and is at the same time, as R. D. Laing (1965:113) words
it, a "type of radar, a scanning mechanism," o ne can easily join with Rollo May (1967:150) in
saying that men's capacity for value-making, "like freedom, reason and the other unique
J
Value Problems as Di lemmas for the Planner
characteristics of the human being - is based upon his consciousness of himself. II Hence, any
fully conscious man is possessed of a seemingly endless range and variety of values, ranging far
and wide over his perceptual and experiential landscape. Erik Erikson (1960:46), reflecting on
the weighty role that values play in forging ones own personal identity, remarked that values,
inner resources, and opportunities for action coincide with one another to help create identity.
'Man is full of wants, JI said Pascal (p. 18), "he loves only those who can satisfy them
all. It The planner is faced with the age-old dilemma of not being able to "satisfy all the people
all the time. II He faces a myrid range of competing values, from a seemingly endless variety of
groups, agencies, organizations, with a sanction given to coordinate and effect these values
that is often shaky at best. Unlike his counterpart in socialist countries (Fisher, 1962:251), he
remains always cognizant of his frequently subliminial status. Kahn assays that the planner is
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Of course, there are many different and varying kinds of values, and it is important for
the planner to begin to distinguish between them, weigh groups of values against others and the
priorities that some values receive over others. The Jesuit analyzer of the casework relationship,
Felix Biestek (1957:95), has separated basic, vital values (such as legal conformance, morality) at
one end of the lamina and relatively unimportant valuations at the other end (like housekeeping
stondcrds, etc.) with a plethora of shades and degrees in between. Suffice it to say that in the
Biestek classification basic, vital values can be so powerful that men will literally die in order
that they might be maintained. It is particularly these kinds of values that should enlist the
ultimate planner concern, because they are truly "inescopob le elements of any rational decision-
making process or of any exercise of choice" (Davidoff and Reiner, 1962: 111).
The noted philosopher Nicholas Rescher (1967:130-137) has written that there is a
remarkably close kinship between the ascriptions of values and traits of character. Value expla-
nations, then, are naturally akin in their logical structure to character explanations, because a
subscription to a certain value is one of the most important elements definitive of a mori's
character. For example, the deeply-held values of a M{:Jrtin Luther King or a Gandhi were
strongly indicative of their respective characters. One does not need to plumb the depths of
Freud to realize and comprehend this fundamental connection. One observer goes so for as to
proclaim that character adjustment in the various stages of personality growth and development is
virtually synonymous with a "process of living up to a set of valuesll(Ginsburg, 1950:478).
In recent years, values have been seen as inestimably salient in the framing and in the
structuring of scientific investigations. Sociology, especially, has been in the forefront, with
the likes of the perspicacious Alvin Goulder (1968:103-116), and Robert Friedrichs (1972)
exposing the myth of a value-free and neutral sociology or social science. They argue, quite
persuasively, that all social scientists, whether they be a Parsons, a Chomsky, or a
C. Wright Mills, approach the study of society from a certain value-base, a certain set of
assumptions and presuppositions (of which they are often unaware or only partially aware). We
now see a call for putting the social scientist's values face-up on the table, a cal' for diminution
and de-emphasizing of the "priestly" Parson-Etzioni-Lipset mold in favor of the "prophetic" caste
of Mills. This new sociological emphasis on value (and on "prophetic" style) should not go
unheeded by the planner. Judging from the labors of planning theorists of the likes of Morris,
Rein, Kahn and Davidoff, value prominence will not stand quiescent.
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faced with the following value problems:
a. There are conflicting, competing values at stake.
b. Value questions must often be posed in an las if I form.
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c. Difficulty of clarifying [ust what the prevelent values or preferences are.
d. Values are not always transitive.
e. Disputes often rage as to whose choices are relevant or most relevant to the
decisions to be made.
f. Difficulty in translating technical issues into their approximate value conse-
quences in a completely objective and understandable, perceivable fashion
(Kahn, 1969:106).
The contravening values existent in any community are obviously of prime moment to the
concerned planner. Community leaders "tend to think of social welfare programs in, to use
Gclbrcith's term, Itheir own conventional wisdom·." The leaders have a widely shared under-
standing of how they believe social welfare ought to operate. Frequently, though, their view is
completely at variance with the desires and needs of those who are clients of social welfare
agencies (Burke, 1965:268). Perhaps this is the most common form of value opposition:
provisioner and provisioned, institutions and their consumers. Morris (1966:191) observes that the
lack of technical preparedness to construct adequate barometers of need "is shown in recent
studies of the gross differences in perception that separate professional staff, agencies, and
consumers, and thus affect utilization patterns. II Just as Marx speaks of class conflict as being
pos itioned a t the very crux of societal interaction, so too, Litwak and Hylton (1962:395-420)
speak of conflicting values and the need for independence as being the raison d ' etre in the very
origins of the agency or organization.
Planners often must perforce phrase questions in an lias if II format. What consequences
that might ensue from the construction of a maximum security institution in a given community
becomes, as it were, a "loaded quesfion" for both planner and community. Other lias if II
questions (which are necessari Iy futuristically-oriented) would or could concern economic oppor-
tunities, or race relations, or adequate public assistance. Often, health and welfare planning
agencies have been forced to avoid such questions and as a result the project involved II no ne of
the crucial and legitimately controversial issues on the community agenda •.. but .•. instead
(was) an antiseptic undertaking widely accepted as 'worthwhi lei II (Adrian, 1960:4). In the lias
if II dimension the planner is attempting to imagine and to convey all relevant, conceivable
experiences that could potentia Ily be drawn on in the planni ng process.
It is indeed difficult for the planner at times to adequately discern and clarify [usr what
the prevalent values or preferences are. Within even one individuaPs value scheme one finds
stances in favor of integrated schools, but against busing, in favor of more social proqrcms, but
against higher taxes. Frequently, a kind of immobilization takes place, and the more strongly-
held values of some begin to fi II the vacuum. The value problems that emerge from a situation
of value immobilization become acute indeed. Here the planner must be especially alert to the
The planner is a product of his experience, and that experience is necessari Iy puny and
limited alongside the collected individual experiences of all those for whom he must plan.
Perhaps the sagacious advice of Henry Moas (1958:22) to caseworkers may be equcl ly uti lizable
For-the planners: ..... help the cl ient to see as clearly as possible and to modify apparently
obstructing attitudes/ feelings, and objective realities in his problem situation." If the planner
In addition to the six value problem areas that Kahn enumerates, I must add two of my
own: first/ the values of the planner intermesh so subtly with the societal brew that he stirs that
it is virtually impossible at times for him to distinguish. "Appropriate planning action cannot be
prescribed from a position of value neutrality, II agrues Davidoff (1965:331), "For prescriptions are
based on desired obiectives." If it is true, as M~clver (1965:5) says, that lithe values and stan-
dards of a people inevitably are related to the conditions they have experienced, II then this
holds equal truth and validity for the individual - for the planner.
Problems often coalesce over the difficulty in translating technical issues into their value
consequences in a completely objec tivisfic trcjecrory . How does the planner handle the desires
and objectives of a multi-service agency wishing to include abortion counselling in their service
program in a strongly Orthodox Jewish or Catholic neighborhood? Howard remarks about how
many societies "toke pride in how effectively their cultures inculcate values, but are unconcerned
about the erratic way in which 'the good things of life' become available" (Howard, 1969:29).
If this be true, then certainly manuvering specific technical issues back to their inevitable value-
underpinnings connot be an easy task.
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complexities and contingencies and the state of obfuscation surrounding the whole matter.
Value Problems in the Sanction of Social Planning
The planner faces the problem of whose choices are relevant or most relevant to the
decisions to be made. In other words, how does one choose the IIrelevant" community in
exploring preferences? In urban renewal, for example, should decisions be effected employing
the values and preferences of the residents of the immediate area, the downtown civic c lubs , or
what? MacRae (1965:255-260) notes that hardly anyone questions the need for planning but that
the essential questions are: "Who should do the planning?" or, more urgently, "Why haven't you
been planning to avoid the mess we are in?1I Actually, planning may have been going on all
along but at the expense of some choices being considered more "re levcnt" than others. In the
course of urban renewal/ it appeared that the values of one "relevant ll community were chosen
over the values of other sundry communities holding other values.
Another thorny element that seems to be continually erupting centers around the changing
nature of values. Perhaps because of the recent work of Alvin Taffler (1970) and others, in
addition to the seemingly near-panic preoccupation with change in various social science studies,
one would be lead to believe that all values are in constant flux, with only a modicu"m of
permanence and stabi lity. But a closer examination reveals that there are some values that are
less transitive than others and are perhaps considerably less transitive than many planners care to
believe. Raymond Plant (1970:2) has observed: "When can the individual [usfificbly refuse to
accept the claims made upon him by society, by the roles which he has to play?" The answer to
this is that he can never really do so, but that there are certain basic and relatively unchanging
values connected wit.h the essence of man that reside, sometimes quite uncomfortably, alongside
those values that are intertwined in the existence of men. In short, does existence precede
essence or essence precede existence?
36 Kansas Journal of Sociology
realizes that he does possess values of his own, and that they are not entities to be completely
avoided (or denied), then he has already taken an important first step in the overall effectiveness
of his planning activity.
The second value problem that should concern the planner is his 1) natural-born tendency
to create an agreement as an escape from controversy, and 2) unwillingness to reveal and to
explicate m.onopolistic and repressive situations existing in society, which tend to thwart and even
extinguish the preferences and values of many. Robert Morris, in expressing some of the hind-
rances that conspire to diminish any effectiveness in change agents, noted:
1. The commitment, inculcated by professional social work training, to education
and the creation of a consensus to a controversy as the mojor acceptable
strategy for prof essional behavior.•••
2. The preoccupation with professional integrity-
3. A latent, if not manifest, commitment on the part of social work toward
protecting the employing agencies ..• (Morris, 1969:283-284).
The Frankfurt School neo-Marxist phi losopher Herbert Marcuse has painted a phi losophical
picture of a society essentially characterized by domination and repression - a "repressive
tolerance. II ·What Marcuse likes to call liberalist society is based, II Maurice Cranston (1969:39)
remarks, on a form of domination so subtle "thor the majority accept and even will their servitude. -
In such a condition tolerance as traditionally understood serves the cause of domination. II If I
Marcuse is philosophically correct then the obligation of the planner accelerates even more to
the forefront - for he must strain to provoke and to stimulate, to formalize and to represent, to
elucidate and to express, all those values that tend towards enfranchising, liberating, rejuven-
ating, and restoring men.
Three Strategies: Rational Analysis, Citizen Participation, Elite Consensus
In Martin Reinls conceptualization there are three essential strategies, all replete with
multi-variant value bases, that contribute to at least partial resolution of the problem of sanction
in the social planning process: "They are elite consensus, rational analysis, and citizen partici-
pation. Each strategy is crucial. None is sufficient by itself, for each has inherent limitations,
but the efforts to pursue more than one strategy at a time often lead to conflict and contradiction ..
Thus in the effort to resolve one di lemma another is created (Rein, 1970:200). In this section
attention will be focused on the value dimension composite of each strategy, something that
Rein does not sufficiently explore. Indeed, the value dimensions of each strategy assume wide
import, for if it is a truism that strategy is directly related to lithe dimensions of feasibility in a
given situation, II (Morris and Binstock, 1966:151) then certainly those elements of feasibility,
or possibility, are intertwined with the values and attitudes of those to whom the question of
feasibi Iity or possibi Iity is put.
The first procedure or strategy giving justification, or sanction for intervention is that
of elite consensus. By this approach the planner has his activity endorsed and supported by the
elite or ruling leadership of the rnojor institutions and controlling interests in the community.
The semina! problem here that the planner immediately confronts is that often the organization
Another major strategy to be considered here is that of "rational analysis" or ''power of
knowledge" schema, the notch on the institutions-planner-consumer scale where the values of the
planner are paramount. This strategy subsumes a "professional" approach - that is, the planner
supposedly harbors a thorough and comprehensive knowledge and information base enabling him to
effectively perform the planning operation.
Since knowledge is of such importance here it follows that the planner wi II wish to
implement research. Aside from the fact of the possibi fity of the research (which is often lengthy)
interfering with the urgency of a given planning operation, it poses rather vexing value dilemmas
as we". One cannot get far away from value, no matter how "objective" the research, no
matter how supposedly "value-free" the planning approach. For out of the research the planner
is faced with selecting priorities amongst various choices.
"can never rise sufficiently above identification with their own organization to furnish the
active, vigorous leadershi p needed ... II (Mayo, 1941: 158). Nevertheless, the planner is
transacting with concentrated power, and, as Coughlin observes, "Community planning will.
be impotent if it has no access to community power. This means that it must involve itself with
the power institutions that exist in the community. The objectives ... will not be achieved
without using power and authority as instruments; without this our mark wi II be neither significant
nor enduri ng .. (Cough lin, 1961 :39) .
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Hence institutions protect -their own interests and mobilize their considerable resources to
maintain themselves. Planners often find that negotiating with these realities tends to ultimately
compromise their own values in subservience to-the values of the institutions with whom they work.
The further and the deeper a planner proceeds along this strategy pathway 1 the more difficult it
becomes to convince himself that innovation and change are actually being effected. The facts
are that the values of institutions are such that change comes very hard, and is not considered
acceptable unless the environment is seen as demanding it. The planner, when he is employing
a primari Iy institution-oriented strategy 1 must be fully cognizant of the why and wherefore of
institutional and organizational values, or else face the inevitable consequences of resultant rack
of effectiveness in convincing organizations of needed attitude and value change.
Thus through this strategy the planner is quite concerned wi th the power that organizations
have and can muster. Organizations and organizational leaders can be very effective indeed in
giving -weight to the findings and recommendations" (Manser, 1960:37). Our very lives are spent
either in organizations or in contact with organizations in a multi-farious number of situations.
So much of our lives center around organizations that philosopher John O'Neill (1972:10) states
thatUhuman experience and vision accumulates only in the circle of social relations and insti-
tutions, which enlarge and deepen the sense of our sentiments, deeds and works through the
symbiosis of sol idarity and personal ity. II
Because of the nearly universalistic aspect of scarcity of resources in meeting the multi-
tudinous variety of problem demands, the planner is inevitably faced with choosing priority
problems and priority goals. Morris and Binstock say that It ••• it goes without saying that the
preference goal is not the planner's ideal, ultimately perfect solution to the problem under
consideration. He is not omnipotent. What he can accomplish is limited by his capacity for
weiJding influence. · · .A preference goal, then, is neither a utopian scheme nor an affirmation
of the status quo. It is a goal which embodies some estimate of feasibility" (Morris and Binstock,
Samuel Mencher essays the following for quality priority planning:
1. The plan must include all welfare functions, even if the body using the plan
will attend to Some, rather than all, functions listed. Thus, functions
normally public must be included in the priority-planning of a voluntary body
even if, after the ordering of functions, public functions wi II be relegated to
public responsibi lity.
2. The major values or goals desired in a community welfare program must be
delineated before examination of specific functions or services that support
these values. There are four major elements in the priority system:
(a.) values or goals, (b.) causal factors or variables, (c.) professional
functions, (d.) specific services. These must be treated as distinct
factors....
Kansas Journal of Sociology
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3. Once the units of the system have been set and the values selected, ordering
of fuctions and the services relevant to these functions is a matter of
expertise....
4. Services must be organized by some rational method according to the
functions they serve. . .
5. . .. although the purpose of priority plans is to aid in the allocation of
community funds, nowhere in current plans is there an attempt at conversion
into budgetary decisions. .. (Mencher, 1967:34-35).
Even without any noticeable amount of research, or without any stated and above-the-
board priorities such as we have [usr considered, the planner is still dealing with his own personal
preferences, his own attitudes and values, his own particularistic visionary stance. J;Some
ways, especially for those with a positivistic or scientific-determinist bent, this is a reality that
is often shirked (Simey, 1968:195). The two dimensions, the personal and the social, are closely
intertwined. Just as Gouldner (1968: 103-116) has exploded the myth of a value-free sociology 1
could we say that it is any less the case with the individual planner in the midst of the planning
operation?
The third strategy is that of citizen participation, whereby the planner can claim sanction
or legitimacy if the programs are supported and upheld by the recipients and consumers of the
service. Certainly this ranks as the most widespread block that the planner must cope wi th , and
to that extent, may be the most complex. Is he to be an "cdvoccre " for the consumer, when
Lisa R. Peattie (1968:87) suggests "thcr the weight of the evidence so far impl ies that the very
considerable short-term inefficiencies and exasperations of advocacy are paid for by the pressure
which they generate for a social policy more sensitive and adaptive to social reality?" Or is
he to be a kind of "value technician, u as some have proffered, merely effecting whatever values
are placed on the table from whatever source?
a. his absolute stock of valued entities;
b. divergence of his stock from his own goals (his aspirations);
c. divergence of the stock of valued entities from a level set by others (this
is the familiar notion of standards). (Davidoff and Reiner, 1962:109)
39Value Problems in the Sanction of Social Planning
What are the characteristics of the external value entities? The stock of such
things as wealth or health that an individual possesses at any time, in combination
with his internal values, provides a significant basis for planning analysis. An
individucf 's well-being is measured by:
2. What is the intensity of the value? Techniques of measurement are not
sharply developed here. The only meaningful intensity scale may be one
measuring overt behavior, for example, migration. It may also be desirable
to distinguish between those values held in private and those shared as when
attitudes are publicly voiced or voted. The planner might be particularly
concerned with identifying conditions under which privately held values
become public. This is related to whether a value is strongly held by an
individual, or whether he is amenable to changing it.
1. For a given value: how widely is it held? What is its spread and distri-
bution in the institution and among client groups?
The planner should consider values from two perspectives: first, as the clients'
internal states of valuation; second, externally, as the entities which are
valued. • . . To lend substance to our discussion of internal states, let us focus
on values such as health, wealth, and power, which might be considered values
at a middle range of generality. These values should be considered in the following
ways.
3. Does the individual believe he can or cannot influence the achievement of
a goal?
Certainly in this strategy the paramount interests of the planner relate to and are hinged on
the values of the clients or consumers concerned, Perhaps the most astute perceptor of this
intricate interaction is the planning theorist Paul Davidoff:
If the planner is truly interested in "o set of social services which are from the consumers'
point of view and not always primarily from the service insfltutlons' point of view, II (Rein,
1968:17) then he must isolate and assimilate the values held in as thorough a manner as Davidoff
describes. One must pay particular heed to values that are covertly proprietored over those
more overtly apparent. Sometimes duties are of such moment, (Newman, 1959:49) and indeed
the dai Iy, grinding humdrum of much of modern-day life of such moment that the expression in
any fashion of ones true values and attitudes on given matters hardly occupies prime attention
in the consciousness of many. Peter Marris (1962: 186) remarks that in a highly integrated,
populous society, "ecch man and woman is individually impotent, dependent upon anonymous
millions to complete his work and satisfy his needs , He needs to be able to retreat into a less
intimidating and complex world, when he can feel himself of more account.... II Indeed, the
planner must be singularly adept at the subtle, pain-staking, ferreting-out process that is
necessary in a society where man increasingly feels himself to be dehumanized, alienated and
unneeded.
In all of this, many individual needs and values can come together to make a farily viable
and consistent whole. This whole we can speak of succinctly as the public interest, commonly
accepted objectives and goals shared by the larger community. Alan Altshuler, a perceptive
planning critic, states:
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Every political planner, no matter how specialized, must be guided by some
conception of the public interest. Since plans are proposals of concerted action
to achieve goals, each must express his conception as a goal or series of goals for
his community. He will probably conceive these goals as constantly shifting rather
than highly stable, as always intermediate rather than final, and as more in the
nature of criteria than of concrete destinations. Community goal conceptions are
likely to have these characteristics because of the limitations on collective human
foresight and imagination. Nonetheless, it is impossible to plan without some sense
of community goals, call them what you wi II ... (Altshuler, 1965: 186).
The planner participates as knowledgeably as he is capable in the heady, oft-times
frustrating, and complicated enterprise of determining [ust what is the exact composition and
nature 'of the public interest. What he perceives as the public interest may only be an illusory
figment of his imagination. There are many "publics" making up the "body public. II Here, the
value exigencies of the second strategy concerning the individual planner and his values, comes
directly into play . Really, citizenry strategy cannot be fully separated from planner strategy,
for ultimately the very perception of the public interest with its accompanying enunciation and
expl ication usually rests in the perceptual and cognitive processes of the planner himself. This
should in no significant manner hinder an earnest, intense effort on the part of the planner himself
in the direction of as impartial, objective and forthright a consideration as could be fashioned of
the manifold and intricate values, needs and aspirations of an often dissimilar, diverse and highly
elusive "body pol itic. II '
Conclusion
The urban community is a complex, variated system of interrelated, [uxrcposed elements,
and, according to Davidoff, "re lcfive ly little is known about how the elements do, will, or
should lnterrelcte , The type of knowledge required by the new comprehensive city planner
demands that the planning profession be comprised of groups of men versed in contemporary
phi losophy, social work, law, the social sciences and civic design . . . II (Davidoff, 1962:337).
Truly, a virtual Rennaissance, do Vincian type of man is called for to meet the desperate,
disordered, intricate organism that we know of as the urban environment today. Interestingly,
social planners reside at the discomforting, but at the same time potentially enervative and
creative point where the social sciences and phi losophy meet and are brought to bear on
substantive problems (Emmet, 1967:21). Perhaps social planning could best be thought of as an
explorative ''field laboratory" for the effective byplay and mutual nourishment that can occur
in the steady process of applying these disciplines to practical social problems.
.'Order,II said Pope (1950:302), "is Heaven1s first law." It surely is true then that men are
possessed of a desire for harmony, for order, for planning. Planning is a necessary and inevitable
prefix to harmony and order. IIAn unplanned society - if, indeed, such a vagary were possible in
the real world - would be an unfree society, II states Walter Firey (1965:48), IIAn unplanned
society would be devoid of the norms which prescribe what ought to be or has a right to be at any
future time. • . ... This "ought to bell aspect is, we must remind ourselves, an ideal.
Hans Kelsen observes that the plan "is a normative order rather than a natural order. Indeed such
attributes of planned activities as value, for instance, have their being entirely in the propositions
of a normative order·' (Kalsen, 1959:229). In all of this, values are an inevitable and requisite
ingredient of any intelligible planning activity. Values can often unwittingly "obscrue the use
of knowledge" (Lappin, 1967:57) in that certain puissant groups with strongly held values can use
(and abuse) knowledge to their own ends. Or, as Bergson (1939:223) averred: "ln a general way,
reality is ordered exactly to the degree in which it satisfies our thought. II
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In further consideration of the three Rein-formulated planning strategies investigated here,
what commonly-held environmental and societal values are the most conducive in provising of a
climate for effective planning? The Robert C. Fried study of planning in post-war Rome tends to
suggest the inherent limitations, rather than the potentialities, of neutrality and expertise as
resources. Fried states that resources would seem to be most valuable and the strategy of profes-
sionalism to have the greatest chances of success (for city planners, at least) where:
1) public attitudes are supportive; 2) politicians feel relatively secure; 3) the
national government takes most of the responsibility for planning; 4) civic
improvement associations are strong; 5) there is a strong upper class, oriented
toward civic improvement; 6) the community has an achievement oriented ethos;
7) the community has a high status; 8) there is some degree of consensus and
mutual trust among and within the parties; 9) there is a strong Social ist party;
10) the legitimacy of political neutrality is recognized in such institutions as
civil service, nonpartisanship, bipartisanship, judicial independence, and
constitutional monarchy.
Professionalism as a political strategy would seem to have the least chance
of success in two closely related kinds of environment: 1) the environment of
totalitarianism and 2) the environment of a political system with severe ideo-
logical fragmentation. In neither of these environments is the claim of expert
neutrality likely to be validated (Fried, 1969:159).
The best-intentioned and most ski IIful planners can and wi II find the age-old verities of
apathy and alienation to be particularly confounding (Brager, 1963:34-40). This may hold true
particularly for the "norrncl ly powerless, unaffiliated groups" (Burke, 1967:254). W'nen
Helen Harris Perlman (1965:413-414) wrote, very eloquently, that "self-determination ... is
the very essence of mature humanness ..... it can be stated without any adulteration that the
actual reality of ascertaining the prompt implementation of this noble and lofty concept with the
powerless, the unaffiliated on a planning basis is a most Herculean chore indeed. But the
planner must attempt to perceive those values held by the ones most hidden from view, as well
as the values of the omnipresent elite, and all in between. Ultimately, all values are of
inestimable notabi lity in any efficacious planning process.
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